[1] Hoover v. Langston Equipment Associates, Inc., 958 F.2d 742, 745 (6th Cir. 1992) (suit correctly dismissed under Rule 9(b) when plaintiff “had not alleged with specificity who had made particular misrepresentations and when they were made”); Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 1990) (complaint under 10b-5 properly dismissed when it failed to state “in any detail what misrepresentations were made by the defendant, to whom these misrepresentations were made, when these misrepresentations were made, or how these misrepresentations furthered the alleged fraudulent scheme”).

[2] Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994). See also Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir. 1993); Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1989).

[3] DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 941 (1990).

[4] Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1990).

[5] See Blake v. Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1988); Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987); Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Sahlen & Associates, Inc. Securities Litigation, 773 F. Supp. 342, 362 (S.D. Fla. 1991). Compare In re GlenFed, Inc. Securities Litigation, 60 F.3d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1995); (“To rely upon the ‘group published information’ presumption, Plaintiffs’ complaint must contain allegations that an outside director either participated in the day-to-day corporate activities, or had a special relationship with the corporation, such as participation in preparing or communicating group information at particular times. . . . Plaintiffs fall short of alleging operational involvement on the part of the outside directors, a prerequisite for group pleading.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). See also In re Storage Technology Corp. Securities Litigation,
 630 F. Supp. 1072, 1076-77 (D. Colo. 1986). One court has drawn a distinction between two types of outside directors — “the paradigmatic outside director who ‘sits on the Board of a large corporation, owns 100 shares of its stock, and attends a Board meeting four times a year’ . . . [and] directors who sit on the board of a small company, and have experience in the industry, or have significant financial holdings in the company,” limiting application of the group pleading concept to the latter category of outside directors. In re U.S. Bioscience Securities Litigation, 806 F. Supp. 1197, 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (applied presumption to four outside directors of a small company who signed the Form 10-K). In re Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,776, at 97,767 n.7 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (representations in prospectus and annual report not sufficient to apply the group doctrine to outside directors), quoting from and distinguishing In re U.S. Bioscience Securities Litigation, 806 F. Supp. 1197, 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1992).

[6] Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124 at 1128; Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir. 1994); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 91 (1990).

[7] In re GlenFed, Inc. Securities Litigation, 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). The court relied on the language of Rule 9(b) and the fact that it was modeled on Order 19, Rule 22 of the English Rules of Practice of 1937, which reads: “Wherever it is material to allege malice, fraudulent intention, knowledge, or other condition of the mind of any person, it shall be sufficient to allege the same as a fact without setting out the circumstances from which the same is to be inferred.” Id. at 1545. Whether or not the strong inference requirement weeds out strike suits is “beside the point. We are not permitted to add new requirements to Rule 9(b) simply because we like the effects of doing so. This is a job for Congress, or for the various legislative, judicial, and advisory bodies involved in the process of amending the Federal Rules.” Id. at 1546. Congress responded to the invitation in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.

[8] Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d at 1128.

[9] See, e.g., In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation, 9 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1993) (there is an interest in deterring the use of the litigation process as a device for extracting undeserved settlements as the price of avoiding the extensive discovery costs that frequently ensue once a complaint survives dismissal, even though no recovery would occur if the suit were litigated to completion). Cf., oft-quoted remark of the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-43 (1975) (“in this type of litigation [Rule 10b-5] . . . the mere existence of an unresolved lawsuit has settlement value to the plaintiff not only because of the possibility that he may prevail on the merits, an entirely legitimate component of settlement value, but [also] because of the threat of extensive discovery and disruption of normal business practices.”).

[10] See, e.g., Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir 1994); Serabian v. Amoskeag Bank Shares, Inc., 24 F.3d 357, 361 (1st Cir. 1994) (listing cases). For other cases, see, e.g., Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp.,
 16 F.3d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994); In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation, 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993); Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061 (5th Cir. 1994).